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Gendered archetypes of wartime occupation: 'New women' in 
occupied north China, 1937-1940. 
 
Introduction 
The release of  Ang Lee's film Lust, Caution in 2007 passed without fanfare in North 
America, Europe and Australasia. In China, however, the release of  a feature film 
detailing the love affair between a 'modern girl' of  1940s Shanghai and a high-ranking 
official in a pro-Japanese puppet government―and based on a novella by an author 
(Eileen Chang) who had herself  often been accused of  acting as a 'cultural traitor' during 
the Japanese occupation of  China―ignited significant controversy. Many of  the 
subsequent and often heated debates focused not purely on the nuanced depictions of  
Chinese 'traitors' in the film, but on the convergence of  questions of  national loyalty and 
explicit sexual content, the latter leading to sections of  the film being heavily edited prior 
to exhibition in Chinese cinemas.1 
 At the heart of  such controversies lay a number of  potential challenges in the film 
to both state-sponsored narratives and popular memories of  the Japanese occupation of  
China. Chief  amongst these was the moral choices made in the film by the central 
character of  Wang Jiazhi, a female Chinese Resistance spy who enters into an intense, 
sexual relationship with a 'collaborator,' eventually betraying the Resistance to save the 
object of  her affection. As Stephanie Hemelryk Donald has suggested, this character 
represented not so much a real individual (despite being inspired by one) as a 'persona' 
that represented 'a failure of  Chinese patriotism.' So sensitive was this aspect of  the film 
that Tang Wei, the actress who played this role―in contrast to her male co-star―was 
temporarily banned from filmmaking in China after the film's release.2 
 The role of  women in resisting or collaborating with the Japanese during the 
Second Sino-Japanese war (1937-45) has emerged as a lively realm of  enquiry in recent 
years―well before the release of  Lust, Caution brought such questions into the 
mainstream of  popular culture. Within this field, the 'scape-goating' of  individual female 
'collaborators' has inspired a number or worthwhile scholarly forays.3 Written in a 
2 
 
biographical mode, and focusing on well-documented cases of  individual 
women―including figures such as Zheng Pingru, who inspired the Wang Jiazhi character 
of  Lust, Caution―such scholarship has highlighted the complex interplay between gender 
and 'collaboration' in wartime China. Historians working in this mode, such as Luo 
Jiurong4 and Yun Xia,5 have helped to overturn an earlier tendency to view 
collaboration (as Timothy Brook has phrased it) as a 'male temptation.'6 They have also 
highlighted the extent to which the very language in which the 'salacious histories' of  
collaboration have been written up until recently has been entirely gendered. 
Government and public reactions to the release of  Lust, Caution point to the continuing 
hegemony of  such discourses in China today. 
 However, while our understanding of  the behavior of  individual women under 
occupation and the gendered historiography of  'collaboration' in China has improved as 
a result of  such scholarship, there is still a good deal we do not know about the use of  
women by collaborationist authorities themselves. To what extent did the various 'puppet 
regimes' which existed in China in the period between 1937 and 1945 deliberately seek to 
either appeal to women, or use women as a vehicle for appealing to potential male 
supporters? How were Chinese women re-imagined under occupation, and how did 
'collaborationist' regimes themselves exploit gender as a means of  selling their political 
agendas? And what are the wider ramifications of  Chinese cases for the emerging field 
of  'collaborationist studies' more generally?  
 These are the questions I will address in this paper. I will do this by analyzing the 
representation of  Chinese women in the visual culture of  the first large-scale 'puppet 
regime' to be established south of  the Great Wall following the Japanese invasion of  
China in 1937: the Provisional Government of  the Republic of  China (Zhonghua minguo 
linshi zhengfu) (PGROC). Heeding the calls that James A. Cook and others have made for 
historians of  China to '...engage in critical analysis of  image-making as a force in shaping 
historical dynamics,'7 this paper interrogates the visual record that this regime left to 
posterity. Specifically, it will involve the analysis of  PGROC poster art, pamphlets, and 
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other forms of  visual media which are readily available outside the People's Republic of  
China, but which have hitherto been overlooked by many scholars. It is hoped that this 
'visual history' approach―in which the pictorial texts produced by this regime are given 
precedence over the written sources which have hitherto dominated the 
above-mentioned biographical studies of  individual female 'collaborators' and the 
archive-driven 'collaborator trial' scholarship―will provide entirely new perspectives on 
the nature of  early wartime collaborationism in China. 
 While it is acknowledged that the collections sourced for this study do not represent 
the totality of  visual culture produced under the PGROC,8 the consistencies in these 
images (drawn from institutionally disparate collections) can shed light on how this 
regime imagined and depicted Chinese women, and in some cases sought to appeal to 
them. In the handful of  studies of  this regime's propaganda which have been published 
on the basis of  such material in the past, race tends to have been premised over gender.9 
As I will show, however, gender was as crucial a thread in the official PGROC narrative 
as was race, and the regime's visual culture was awash with often conflicting though 
remarkably regular messages about the role of  women in an occupied China in particular. 
 The visual depictions of  women under the PGROC deserves our attention for a 
number of  reasons. Firstly, despite the acknowledged idiosyncrasies of  this regime, and 
indeed the uniqueness of  all 'puppet regimes' which were created in the twentieth century, 
it is my contention that PGROC deployment of  gendered archetypes helps shed light on 
the place of  gender in 'collaborationist nationalism' more generally. The archetypes I 
explore below represented a particular time and place, but the parallels that emerge with 
archetypes emerging under 'puppet regimes' in other often quite distant contexts suggest 
continuities and convergences that need to be explored further. In other words, while this 
article looks specifically at the role of  one (of  many) wartime collaborationist regimes in 
China, it is my hope that it will represent the first step towards a more comparative study 
which will be of  interest not merely to historians of  China, but which might help remedy 
the scarcity of  comparative studies of  European and Asian experiences of  
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collaboration.10 The PGROC may well have been different from the regimes which 
preceded and subsumed it in Japanese-occupied China, but it was also entailed 
remarkably similar imaginings of  women to those we find in other occupation contexts. 
In light of  recent and ongoing cases of  occupation around the world today, these are 
issues that remain highly pertinent. 
 
Female archetypes of  collaboration 
As a field of  scholarly enquiry, the representation of  women by collaborationist China 
remains in its infancy, with only the important work of  Nicole Huang having addressed 
the fundamental redefinition of  the urban Chinese woman that occurred under Japanese 
occupation, and the replacement of  the much-documented 'modern girl' (modeng nülang) 
of  1930s Shanghai print culture with 'pan-Asian' beauties and quasi-historical 'shinü' (lit., 
'graceful ladies') in the occupation print media.11 The sheer lack of  analysis beyond that 
conducted by Huang, however, puts the historiography of  wartime China at odds with 
that of  occupied Europe, and especially wartime France.12 As historians of  Vichy have 
stressed, for instance, the entire debate around the nature of  the German occupation has 
often been framed in a gendered fashion, presenting French wartime collaboration either 
as an act of  'feminine sexual betrayal' or as a 'feminized moment of  weakness in which 
the French nation "got into bed with the Germans".'13 For others, the 'crisis of  
masculinity' that accompanied the military defeat of  1940 continued to pervade Vichy 
political culture, with what Luc Capdevila has termed a 'metadiscourse' of  'virility' and 
'maleness' permeating all levels of  public discussion in Vichy France (and much of  the 
postwar historiography of  this regime).14 
 In the case of  wartime France, this tendency to articulate collaboration in a 
gendered manner was, in part, the result of  the message that Vichy itself  projected. 
Miranda Pollard, for instance, has demonstrated how the 'radically patriarchal restoration' 
witnessed in wartime France was central to Vichy ideology, with French collaborators 
justifying a shift in social attitudes towards women within a framework of  what she refers 
to as 'anti-eroticism' and 'natalist-familialism,' because they believed that the capitulation 
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of  1940 had resulted from a combination of  low population growth and sexual 
promiscuity in the pre-war years. Occupied France needed young mothers to produce the 
next generation of  Frenchmen, but also women who would be willing to do so within a 
completely desexualized public sphere.15  
 Francine Muel-Dreyfus goes even further in suggesting that the very transformation 
of  the image of  French women under Vichy, achieved through the mobilization of  older, 
pre-war symbols of  motherhood, was one of  the central pillars of  the Vichy project. The 
invention of  what she calls the 'Vichy mother'―a self-sacrificing and unadorned figure 
who was celebrated through state-sponsored rituals―was equal in importance to the 
creation of  a personality cult around the patriarchal figure of  Marshall Pétain himself.16 
All of  this was reflected in the depiction of  women in Vichy propaganda, much of  which 
bears a striking resonance with the celebration of  gendered archetypes in occupied China 
(to be explored below). Idealized Vichy women were often presented in the absence of  
French male spouses, for instance, but in the embrace of  male children, their sexuality 
maternalized, and their maternity valorized. They were not necessarily docile, however, as 
publicity campaigns, institutionalized through the celebration of  Mother's Day, both 
depicted and encouraged Vichy women to be politically aware and active. In other words, 
the Vichy mother embraced wartime modernity as well as conservative prewar social 
values.  
 The historiography of  Vichy has provided us with the most prolific scholarship on 
the creation of  gendered collaborationist archetypes (hence my use of  this literature as a 
point of  departure for this study). WWII France is certainly not the only context in 
which we find such figures emerging, however. Michael Kim reminds us that the 'the 
reinvention of  the New Woman' was central to the aesthetics of  collaboration in late 
colonial Korea in the early 1940s, for example, this figure being deployed to inspire a 
dedication to modesty, austerity, and self-driven responsibility in Japanese-controlled 
Korea, doing so in traditional Korean attire while embracing the 'newness' that total war 
in East Asia presaged.17 In wartime Slovenia, too, groups which collaborated with the 
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Axis powers developed a '...conflicted image of the ideal Slovene woman, one that 
fluctuated between a passive, domesticated woman and an anti-Communist activist.'18 
 What the prevalence of such figures hints at is something common to the 
experience of wartime occupation which leads to the creation of certain types of female 
archetypes, in spite of the cultural, political and even temporal gaps between vastly 
different collaborationist regimes. One recurring feature, for instance, is the tendency on 
the part of early post-occupation regimes to turn to female archetypes as symbols of 
maternal stability at a time of upheaval. Indeed, while many collaborationist regimes 
seem to struggle with existentialist questions about the failure of male national elites to 
defend against foreign invasion, such regimes appear to find solace in the notion of 
women as the mothers of a new, stronger and more morally upright generation of an 
occupied people. The '...placing [of] women's reproductive nature and duty into the 
broader terms of warfare' is, of course, something also commonly practiced by resistance 
movements under occupation.19 However, collaborationist cults of motherhood are ones 
from which fathers are often expunged, or in which mothers are presented as the 
harbingers of sexual and eventually social union between occupying forces and occupied 
populations. 
 Secondly, the very context of foreign occupation, in which local male populations 
are either imprisoned, killed, conscripted or simply not trusted with any responsibility by 
an occupying force, leads to a situation in which, rhetorically―if not practically―space 
develops for new ideas about women's potential contributions to society. This goes 
beyond the production of 'Rosie the Riveter'-type tropes (common to many societies at 
war), for it involves the development of new symbols of womanhood not simply in the 
absence of fighting-age men, but alongside the denigration and humiliation of such men. 
One sees this in the development of the new 'types' of women that Nicole Huang has 
identified in Shanghai print culture, but examples are equally evident in experiments with 
female roles in Vichy cinema of the sort explored by Carrie Tarr.20 
 Moreover, for any collaborationist regime, the enemy is not, by definition, the 
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foreign occupier―an external force violating territorial integrity. Rather, it is a group of  
recalcitrant compatriots who refuse to surrender to that foreign force. This in itself  turns 
the gendered rhetoric of  female victimhood―so common to resistance propaganda in so 
many contexts―on its head, for it makes the very notion of  conflating territorial and 
sexual conquest problematic. While a collaborationist administration can certainly 
manufacture images of  women suffering sexual violence at the hands of  resistance 
fighters (or even present resistors as stooges of  some foreign force), it is far more 
difficult to work metaphors of, for example, 'ravished women' into narratives of  national 
liberation―as resistance movements often do.21 Collaborationist nationalism also puts a 
quite different 'spin' on Gayatri Spivak's equation of  occupation representing 'white men 
saving brown women from brown men'―cited in recent studies of  women under 
occupation in a variety of  contexts22―for it often seems to grant symbolic agency to 
female archetypes while downplaying notions of  female victimhood.23  
 Finally, occupation by its very nature is 'new'―it marks a departure from that which 
came before it, and pre-war social ills which collaborationist regimes blame for military 
defeat. Yet collaborationist regimes are also eager to underline their nationalist 
credentials (i.e., their legitimacy in the eyes of an occupied population), and sometimes 
do this by adopting what they deem to be traditional notions of society, the family, and 
moral behavior. Herein lies the 'new'/tradition binary that we see emerging in a number 
of cases of collaborationism, and which seems to influence many collaborationist 
representations of women. 'New times' call for 'new women,' but they equally call for 
women who can restore past glories and traditions to a society which, under occupation, 
has suffered the ultimate humiliation. 
 
Tradition and the 'New Order' in occupied north China 
The PGROC came into existence in December 1937 as the result of  a compromise 
between Japan's North China Area Army, the Kwantung Army, and anti-Nationalist 
Chinese elites in the region who had expressed a willingness to work with the Japanese in 
the months following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 7, 1937). While the 
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semi-autonomous Kwantung Army had been keen to create a separate 'north China' 
(Hua Bei) state in the 1930s, those Chinese who were willing to collaborate with the 
Japanese preferred instead to retain the illusion of  a unified China, hence the creation of  
this temporary and nominally Chinese administration under Japanese tutelage, and the 
adoption of  nomenclature (i.e., 'provisional government') derived from the 1911 
revolution.  
 Despite the national pretensions of  its title, this regime stretched only over sections 
of  north China. It encompassed the city of  Beiping/Beijing (arguably the 'best educated' 
of  cities in China at the time, and the birthplace of  the 'New Culture' and May 4th 
Movements in the 1910s and 1920s) as well as major urban and cosmopolitan centers like 
Tianjin and Qingdao. In addition, however, it claimed ownership over some the poorest 
sections of  the north China plain, as well as some of  the most fiercely contested counties 
in the provinces of  Shanxi and Hebei.24 This diverse mix of  constituencies would shape 
how the regime defined itself, and the messages it tried to sell. 
 The PGROC was led by 'disgruntled ex-officials' of  the Beiyang regime25 (which 
had ruled in north China from 1916 to the foundation of  a unified Chinese Republic in 
Nanjing in 1928), as well as by defectors from the Nationalist government who had 
chosen to side against Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek. Its figurehead was the 
uncharismatic former Minister of  Finance Wang Kemin, who was known more for the 
glamour of  his consort than for his leadership qualities.26 It also retained amongst its 
staff  officials who had served in the Beiyang regime prior to the invasion, while in key 
ministries, Japanese advisors maintained significant control.27 Despite some autonomy in 
terms of  taxation and revenue, it was beholden to the North China Area Army for its 
very existence, and was not viewed in north China itself  as being genuinely 
independent.28 Its propaganda apparatus, despite being staffed by Chinese cadres, was 
ultimately guided by the Japanese.29 
 Nonetheless, the story that Wang Kemin and his courtiers attempted to tell about 
their regime, and the symbols of  nationhood that they chose to adopt, reflected the age 
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and background of  the Chinese men who supported the regime's founding, and whose 
careers had generally peaked during the warlord years.30 The PGROC adopted the 
five-colored flag of  the early Republic, for instance, while vehemently rejecting Sun 
Yat-sen's 'Three Principles of  the People' (the ideological basis of  Chinese 
Republicanism in Nanjing). It re-established Beijing (having the city revert to this 
toponym from its Republican-era 'Beiping') as the national capital, and sought to counter 
what it saw as negative Western influence of  the sort associated with the treaty ports. Its 
rhetoric ranged from anti-communist and anti-Kuomintang vitriol to slogans lauding 
peace and the promise of  'living safely and enjoying one's work' (anju leye) under Japanese 
domination. 
 In many areas of  its operations, the regime was reliant upon Japanese precedents. 
This was certainly the case for propaganda, where institutional models of  mobilization, 
such as the Xinminhui (New People's Association) were borrowed unashamedly from the 
quasi-state of  Manchukuo (created and largely governed by the Kwantung Army).31 As a 
result of  the unattributed nature of  almost all of  the visual propaganda produced either 
by or in support of  the PGROC, it remains virtually impossible to draw a clear line 
between propaganda produced by the Japanese military, and that produced by Chinese 
employees of  the PGROC and its affiliate organizations.32 Thus, while there existed 
significant differences of  opinion between Wang Kemin and his Japanese backers behind 
the scenes,33 little of  this was aired in public. 
 Despite all this, the PGROC was publicly adamant about its Chinese credentials. In 
trying to justify its very existence as a Chinese government (rather than merely a client 
state), the regime presented itself  as a protector of  a specific set of  Chinese cultural traits. 
It lauded a pre-Opium War China, when the '...people's lives, thinking and culture had all 
been good,'34 and suggested that its role was to resurrect those social institutions which 
it perceived to have been threatened by modernity, both from abroad and in its May 4th 
manifestations.35 Under an ideological system referred to as the Wangdao/ōdō (Kingly 
Way)―another import from Manchukuo―the PGROC promoted a return to 
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pre-Republican ideals of  Confucianism, and put the 'Chinese family' at the heart of  its 
ethos. As one contemporary American observer of  the regime put it, the PGROC aimed: 
 
 ...to make the social customs of  an agricultural society, strong family ties, acceptance   
 of  authority of  the head of  the family and the head of  the village, reverence for   
 Confucianism, and observation of...religious ceremonies the basis of  control.36 
 
 Concurrently, however, this regime encouraged acceptance of  a 'New Order in East 
Asia' (Dong Ya xin zhixu/Tōa shin chitsujo) under Japanese leadership. Indeed, much of  the 
rhetoric of  the regime was based around 'newness,' and great store was put into 
exhorting sections of  the population, including educated urban women, to become active 
in the 'new' occupation politics. This 'ideological cleavage,' as Lincoln Li has described 
it―i.e., encouraging a return to Confucian 'tradition' while at the same promoting 'the 
new'―would plague the propaganda efforts of  this regime, and would manifest itself  in 
competition between different sections of  the 'puppet government.'  
 On one side was the Xinminhui, under the management of  former Nationalist 
propagandist Miao Bin, but responsible for activities which involved significant 
contributions from women, including '...propaganda, food rationing, social services and 
surveillance of  teachers and students.'37 The Xinminhui promoted the image of  a 
dynamic, forward-looking north China via 'new' propaganda techniques such as mobile 
dramatic troupes, newspapers and public meetings. It also called openly for the 
'liberation' (jiefang) of  women in China, and argued that the replacement of  polygamy 
with monogamy (yi fu yi qi zhuyi)―a system that 'all civilized societies' practiced―was 
preferable for China under the 'New Order.'38 The Xinminhui spoke directly to literate 
Chinese women via its organizational newspaper, the Xinminbao, which included a regular 
supplement for female readers entitled 'Mingzhu' (Pearl). (Figure 1) 
 In contrast, there were the ministries within the PGROC, which enforced social 
policies that it believed would promote the restitution of  Chinese 'tradition.'39 The aim, 
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as John Hunter Boyle has explained it, was to emphasize '...a passive citizenry absorbing 
the lessons of  moral example provided by the ruler as a means of  warding off  the 
infection of  Western materialism, liberalism and communism...'40 
 A further source of  contradiction was that the PGROC sought to sell its bifurcated 
message to two distinct constituencies: (i) The rural male gentry on the north China plain, 
who the PGROC believed had the potential to determine the longevity of  this regime, 
and whose loyalty was believed to be more easily won (given communist support 
amongst the peasantry);41 and (ii) an educated and cosmopolitan population of  urban 
men and women (especially students) in Beijing, and in other cities along the railway lines 
which the PGROC controlled. In this regard, the regime's approach differed from earlier 
efforts by the North China Area Army which had purposefully courted the peasantry as 
it moved through rural areas in 1937. As George Taylor, one of  the first Western 
scholars to analyze the PGROC noted in 1940, the 'gaudily colored pictures of  northern 
peasants [which had] dominated posters designed to portray....the blessings of  the new 
order' disappeared as soon as the PGROC was established, with such figures replaced 
almost immediately by a new set of  visual icons catering to very different social milieux.42   
 Propaganda designed to convert both these groups, and celebrating both 'newness' 
and tradition, all put women at the centre of  the regime's propaganda. Indeed, female 
icons were a staple part of  the visual narrative of  this regime from its very outset, while 
the mobilization of  women represented an important part of  the regime's quotidian 
activities. A radiant female colossus in flowing robes―looking remarkably Greco-Roman 
in conception, despite East Asian facial features―was deployed to mark the regime's 
official adoption of  the rhetoric of  a 'New Order in East Asia,' for example. Standing on 
a globe and worshipped by a group of  pan-Asian schoolchildren, the non-attributed 
figure appeared under the term 'cornerstone of  peace' (heping zhi jishi) in one of  Beijing's 
most widely circulated newspapers in March 1939.43  
 As part of  the PGROC's system of  political control, women's 'propaganda teams' 
(funü xuanfuban/bu) were established in Beijing, while specific sections of  the state, such 
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as the police, claimed their own 'women's goodwill divisions' (funü weiwentuan) which were 
tasked with soliciting public support for the regime's security efforts.44 (Figure 2) The 
PGROC sponsored journals and other publications aimed at literate women,45 and it 
cultivated, within strict limits, a body of  work by female Chinese authors.46  
 Much of  this has been hitherto overlooked. David Nelson Rowe, who was present 
in north China at the creation of  the PGROC, for example, noted a marked lack of  
textual references to 'the family,' or to the duties of  spouses, parents, and children, in the 
regime's propaganda. Instead, Rowe argued that most propaganda in occupied north 
China called on the people to recognize the inevitability of  a Japanese victory, to reject 
communism and the Chinese Nationalists, to uphold the new government of  Wang 
Kemin, and to embrace Pan-Asian unity.47 Tvisual fashion in which such messages were 
expressed was highly gendered, however. In calling on its citizens to defend the 'new 
government,' (xin zhengfu) for instance, the PGROC created highly gendered ideals of  an 
occupied Chinese citizenry which drew on both Chinese and other Asian precedents; and 
accompanying its textual attacks on the Chinese communists were visual messages about 
the potential for women to either resist or aid the spread of  this ideology.  
 Above all, however, the PGROC would oversee the creation of  a number of  
repetitive female archetypes to which its artists would regularly return when glorifying the 
regime. These archetypes were intertextual, emerging not only in propaganda art, but 
also―as we shall see below―in other forms of  wartime cultural production, from cinema 
to photojournalism. 
 The most frequent of  these was one which I refer to as the 'PGROC new woman.' 
This is a label that I have derived from the PGROC itself, for although it never titled its 
propaganda in such a fashion, the regime did use the phrase 'new woman' in the very 
institutions it created, such as the New Women's Society (Xin Funü She) which it 
established in Beijing in 1939.48 Like almost all Chinese governments throughout the 
twentieth century, the PGROC wrote frequently of  its role in awakening 'new women' 
(xin nüxing / xinxing funü), and the language (if  not the imagery) deployed by the PGROC 
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looks remarkably similar to twentieth-century authoritarian Chinese regimes which came 
before and after it.49 Indeed, it fell into a well-studied pattern whereby male Chinese 
elites defined then called upon female archetypes to reinforce the 'nationalist project of  
state building.'50 Nonetheless, this archetype became a constant feature of  PGROC 
propaganda which centered around the rhetoric of  the 'New Order'―so much so that the 
visual culture of  early collaborationist China cannot be fully understood without 
considering it. 
 
From modern girls to new women 
As Madeleine Yue Dong has noted, the much celebrated 'modern girl' of  pre-war 
Shanghai popular culture had a fraught history under Japanese occupation. The case of  
Zheng Pingru―an individual associated with the 'modern girl' image who, in working for 
the Chinese resistance, inspired the plot Eileen Chang's Lust, Caution (with which I 
started this analysis)―sullied the very notion of  'modern girls' under the collaborationist 
government of  Wang Jingwei in the 1940s.51 Well prior to this, however, male 
collaborators had tended to look unfavorably upon a 'type' so closely associated with 
what they perceived as treaty port decadence. Indeed, it is noteworthy that for the 
PGROC, the 'new woman' (which I shall explore in some depth below) owed far more to 
the normative celebrations of  Chinese womanhood encouraged by conservative elements 
in Republican China prior to 1937, than to the laissez-faire cultural attitudes associated 
with the 'modern girls' of  urban commercial culture.  
 Like the mid-Republican-era 'new woman' who, as Hsiao-pei Yen reminds us, had 
been championed under the auspices of  the New Life Movement in Chiang Kai-shek's 
Nanjing at the expense of  the 'modern girl,'52 the PGROC's 'new woman' was always 
shown adhering to a strict set of  vestimentary norms which set her distinctly apart from 
earlier imagery. These included low hemlines, long sleeves, and a distinct lack of  
cosmetics and jewelry. She was virtually always depicted in a cheongsam (and never in 
Western dress), but unlike the cheongsams associated with the 'modern girl' of  prewar 
poster art and cinema,53 these were rarely form-fitting, invariably plain or monochrome 
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in design (often of  indanthrene blue, crimson or green hue) and never revealed 
significant amounts of  flesh.54 On the rare occasions when her feet were included in 
images, she wore plain cotton shoes (rather than stilettos―a shoe which was ridiculed in 
the PGROC press).55 The PGROC's 'new woman' was also groomed conservatively, 
adhering to the New Life disdain for the bob and the perm,56 wearing her hair instead in 
a bun, coil, or fringe. In sum, this figure had a distinctly Republican-era provenance, but 
one which rejected the overt eroticism and glamour of  pre-war Shanghai commercial 
culture, adhering instead to an aesthetic regime remarkably similar to that enshrined in 
the New Life Movement of  the mid 1930s, despite the PGROC's expressions of  loathing 
for Chiang Kai-shek's brand of  Republican nationalism (Figure 3).While this 'new 
woman' was often shown to be in good physical health and smiling―her face was always 
visible, though she tended not to stare directly at the viewer―she was not necessarily 
seductive. Indeed, the effect of  her austere clothing regime and her lack of  
accoutrements, and of  only the most rudimentary pictorial references to her body, was to 
desexualize her.  
 This 'new woman' did not exist in isolation. Images of  north Chinese 'beauties' 
(meiren) were also reproduced in large quantity for Japanese consumption in the same 
period. Japanese-language pictorials which celebrated this realm of  conquest, such as Kita 
Shina (given the English title of  The North China), included photography of  north 
Chinese women in form-hugging and elaborately designed cheongsams at famous Beijing 
landmarks. Such figures were shown commonly in placid, non-aggressive, but alluring 
poses, strolling in pairs or small groups down streets or through gardens, or admiring the 
view over occupied cities and towns. They were commonly pictured from behind (unlike 
the 'PGROC new woman,' whose face was regularly visible), as objects of  a male and 
specifically Japanese gaze.57 (Figure 4). 
Despite the distinction between the PGROC 'new woman' and the sexualized 
Chinese 'beauties' marketed to Japanese readers, it is clear that the 'new woman' 
archetype evolved out of  gendered iconography used in early wartime Japanese military 
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propaganda. Indeed, Japanese propaganda printed prior to the founding of  the PGROC 
(but for an occupied Chinese audience) betrayed a rather confused manipulation of  
gendered imagery. Early prototypes of  the 'new woman' were used on handbills and 
pamphlets distributed in Beijing in 1937, for example. These depicted a figure who lay 
somewhere in the middle of  the 'modern girl-new woman' spectrum―welcoming 
Japanese troops, encouraging other Chinese to collaborate, or celebrating the peace that 
occupation supposedly promised. (Figure 5) Importantly, such figures retained much of  
the adornment and glamour associated with pre-1937 depictions of  Chinese 'beauties' in 
the Japanese commonwealth (and references to 'modern girl' imagery in Chinese 
commercial art), complete with form-fitting cheongsam, permed hair, and jewelry. At the 
same time, however, they pointed to the potential for young Chinese women to become 
involved in the politics of  collaboration. 
This early 'pre-PGROC new woman' figure did not entirely disappear with the 
founding of  Wang Kemin's regime, either, for she was used in advertising material for 
state-backed enterprises such as the PGROC's Federal Reserve Bank (Zhonghua Lianhe 
Zhunbei Yinhang), founded in March 1938. Indeed, north Chinese savers were 
encouraged to take up a new PGROC-backed currency in this period with the aid of  a 
highly sexualized 'modern girl' figure, dressed in form-fitting floral cheongsam and 
reclining in a pose typical of  pre-war commercial print culture.58 Such figures also 
survived in PGROC propaganda which spoke to a broader audience in the early 
occupation period. (Figure 6) 
 In much PGROC visual culture, however, it was the 'new woman' who dominated 
the regime's iconography. She appeared with a remarkable level of  consistency in terms 
of  clothing, adornment, pose, hairstyle and framing. In many depictions she either held 
or was pictured in close proximity to the five-colored flag of  the PGROC, dispelling any 
ambiguities about her political proclivities (and referencing Manchukuo antecedents).59 
Significantly, she was commonly pictured at the very center of  such posters and leaflets, 
and when not, the stark color of  her clothing would have the effect of  drawing the 
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viewer's gaze to her. 
There were other unique elements to this archetype which reflected the 'ideological 
cleavage' that had plagued the regime's message from December 1937 onwards. And 
significantly, it is these features which provide intriguing parallels with other 
collaborationist archetypes, such as the Vichy Mother. The most noticeable similarity 
between the two was the overt references to motherhood and daughterhood. These were 
made in the PGROC case either through corporeal connections between the 'new 
woman' and (particularly male) children, for this figure was regularly shown embracing or 
standing next to a male child. Yet they were also present in depictions of  this figure 
engaged in ancestor worship or accompanying children in religious observances, and in 
references to the 'new woman' aiding the elderly (Figures 7 and 8). 
Markedly, however, this 'new woman' (like the Vichy Mother) was rarely shown in the 
presence of  husbands, potential Chinese male suitors, or fighting-age Chinese males. 
Indeed, in most of  the posters and pamphlets which employ this figure, no young 
Chinese men are depicted. One might speculate about the extent to which the male 
figureheads of  the PGROC, and particularly Wang Kemin, acted as surrogate patriarchs 
in this visual culture: it was surely more than coincidence that one hagiographic essay on 
Wang (complete with official portrait) appeared alongside a 3-page, illustrated feature on 
'Chinese female students' in a Japanese-produced, Chinese-language pictorial in 1939.60 
Either way, it was certainly the case that few actual depictions of  patriarchal figures or 
husbands were included in poster depictions of  the PGROC's 'new women.' Like the 
'sexless maternalism' of  Pollard's Vichy woman, the 'new woman' was deployed as a 
potent symbol of  occupied China precisely because she was untainted by young Chinese 
men (i.e., potential resistors), and could be imagined as rearing a new generation of  male 
East Asian children who would welcome Sino-Japanese cooperation in some distant 
future.  
None of  this is to suggest that PGROC iconography was devoid of  Chinese male 
figures. An entire (though very different) study might be dedicated to the equally 
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ubiquitous 'PGROC male student' in his changpao (long scholar's gown) and skullcap, 
which was found in equal abundance in PGROC poster art, often depicted waving the 
five-colored flag, shouting at rallies or chasing the PGROC's enemies from north China. 
Indeed, it is significant that exhibitions of  PGROC propaganda organized in Japan in 
this period (and specifically for Japanese audiences) focused not on female archetypes but 
primarily on these male figures: PGROC poster art displayed as part of  the China 
Incident Holy War Exposition in Japan in late 1938, for example, appears hardly to have 
included images of  Chinese women at all. 61 What the rarity of  images showing young 
'new couples' does demonstrate, however, is a pictorial segregation of  male and female 
archetypes in PGROC iconography. 
Like Pollard's and Muel-Dreyfus' Vichy Mother, the PGROC 'new woman' guided 
the vulnerable to safety by convincing them of  the benefits of  collaboration. She 
shepherded others (especially children and the elderly) towards some bright and peaceful 
future promised by occupation, rather than following patriarchal guidance. (Figure 9) She 
'bought into' the roles of  young mother and pious daughter that PGROC Confucianism 
demanded. 
This 'new woman' thus appears to have been used to appeal directly to Chinese 
women themselves. In Beijing, where a significant and politically active population of  
female students existed, she was employed to mobilize women through pro-collaboration 
civic groups. Insofar as this archetype dressed and was depicted as behaving in the 
manner of  a Republican student, we might even assume that her primary purpose was to 
challenge anti-Japanese sentiment amongst Beijing's significant population of  educated 
young women at the time, for countering student nationalism exercised the PGROC and 
the Japanese for much of  the 1937-40 period.62 Rather than advising educated young 
women to return to their homes then, the PGROC encouraged them to take to the 
streets, to engage in campaigns and to celebrate the birth of  the 'New Order' by chasing 
Chiang Kai-shek from China―as her predecessors had done to warlords some years 
earlier. In other words, she was a highly complex role model which reflected the 
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contradictions inherent in the ideology espoused by the PGROC. She was given a 
conservative and austere appearance, and was pictured fulfilling 'traditional' roles mother 
and pious daughter; at the same time, however, she was politically active and self-driven, 
inheriting many of  the same traits that her pre-war Beijing student sisters had claimed in 
the spirit of  the May 4th Movement.  
There is, nonetheless, evidence to suggest that the PGROC 'new woman,' could also 
be utilized as a figure of  desire, and that she was also certainly consumed by a male 
audience as an object of  desire. Indeed, this is precisely what this regime sought to 
achieve in 1939 via its media infrastructure, and specifically the North China Film 
Company (Huabei Dianying Gufen Gongsi). While the Manchurian-born Japanese 
actress and singer Li Xianglan/Yamaguchi Yoshiko―assumed by audiences all over Asia 
at the time to be Chinese―has inspired a significant amount of  scholarship about 
Japanese depictions of  occupied China for a 'homefront' audience during World War II, 
this celebrity's role in a feature film partly produced by the North China Film Company, 
and exhibited both in Japan and China itself, is largely overlooked. Nessa no chikai /Resha 
de Shiyan (Vow in the Desert) was a commercially successful movie which included Li/ 
Yamaguchi playing the very role of  a PGROC 'new woman,' in a story about Japanese 
efforts to forge modern infrastructure projects in an occupied north China. The film 
lifted this archetype from the two-dimensional media she had inhabited beforehand, and 
transformed her into an active, speaking (and singing) figure to be consumed by 
cinema-goers in Tokyo and Beijing alike. The main female protagonist of  the film was 
clearly packaged as an object of  desire (Yamaguchi/Li was already established as a 
pan-Asian sex symbol on account of  the success of  a number of  her earlier films), and 
though austere in dress and behavior in this feature, she embodied a highly sexualized 
interpretation of  the 'PGROC new woman.' Indeed, as with almost all of  the wartime 
films that Yamaguchi made, the character eventually marries a male Japanese protagonist 
in a formulaic narrative about Sino-Japanese amity.63 If  the two dimensional 'new 
woman' had inhabited visual spaces in which spouses were absent, cinematic 
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interpretations of  the same figure suggested a future in which suitable Japanese husbands 
could be found. The celluloid 'new woman' demonstrated that such archetypes could be 
consumed by male audiences as much as they could be used to stir Chinese women into 
political action. 
 
The new woman's rural past 
Despite her ubiquity, the 'new woman' was not the only archetype to appeasr in 
PGROC propaganda. In poster art produced for a rural male audience in occupied north 
China, for instance, frugally dressed peasant women (in plain cotton shanku rather than 
cheongsams) were pictured next to husbands; their role as mother and spouse was 
emphasized in the textual accompaniment to such imagery, which spoke of  women 
'following the wishes of  their husbands.' (Figure 10) These imagined rural women 
differed from their urban contemporaries in other key respects: they were generally only 
depicted in domestic scenes, and in poses or activities which suggested little agency. Rural 
wives and daughters were also mentioned with some regularity in textual propaganda 
aimed at the literate rural elite, in which women were listed, alongside livestock and grain, 
as assets that the Chinese communists would despoil if  they were allowed to take control 
of  the area. '[Your] young women are being forced to join the comfort corps, and their 
chastity is being taken away as they fool around with soldiers...' warned one leaflet 
distributed to 'village elders' in 1939, for instance.64 
As with the PGROC 'new woman,' however, such rural archetypes could also be 
transformed into three-dimensional figures. The 1938 propaganda film Tōyō no heiwa 
michi/ Dongyang heping zhi lu (Road to Peace in the Orient), starring the then relatively 
unknown Chinese actress Bai Guang,65 told the story of  a demure Chinese peasant wife 
and her husband who escape the turmoil of  war and flee for the safety of  
Japanese-occupied regions of  the country.66 The film was lauded, significantly, in the 
Xinminbao,67 and in advertising for the film, it was a smiling Bai Guang, in headscarf  and 
padded cotton, who was fore-grounded over her male co-star.68  
 Where the peasant girl archetype was important, however, was in providing a 'back 
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story' to the 'new woman,' much as Li Xianglan's character in Vow in the Desert had 
provided an imagined future. Indeed, despite the very real differences in appearance and 
context of  these two figures, it is noteworthy that they sometimes overlapped or 
morphed into one another in PGROC propaganda.  
 We can find one example of  this in a quasi-biographical leaflet of  unclear 
provenance which was produced some time in or around 1939, and which tells the story 
of  one almost certainly hypothetical woman called Wan Ruyu. The story, written in the 
voice of  Ruyu herself, tells of  rustic bliss in a Shanxi village which is disrupted by the 
arrival of  communist anti-Japanese resistance forces. The communists ask for money, 
poison Ruyu's father (after accusing him of  being a landlord and a capitalist), rape her 
sister, and lay waste to their village, leaving her no choice but to leave her birthplace and 
escape to the PGROC capital: 
 
I am a country girl who has only received a junior high school education. I come from a village 
called Xihecun, in Wutai County in the province of  Shanxi. My village has already been turned 
into hell under the heel of  the communists, and because our hometown has been turned into a 
living hell, I have taken my younger brother of  six years old, and abandoning the family 
business, fled along with my mother to the radiant city of  Beijing.69 
 
Such an account―sourced from a collection of  Japanese military ephemera―needs to be 
understood in its proper context. From January 1939 onwards, the Japanese were 
engaged in a brutal campaign in rural north China aimed at defeating resistance beyond 
the cities controlled by the PGROC.70 Propaganda of  this sort was clearly designed to 
undermine support for such resistance amongst the rural population (and especially the 
gentry). Moreover, stories of  this sort were common in the canon of  propaganda 
produced in occupied north China. In his classic work on occupation literature, Edward 
Gunn Jr. has noted that stories appearing in the north China press '...frequently centered 
on a rural village and its struggle with [communist] guerillas,' and commonly detailed 
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rape and other atrocities supposedly committed by anti-Japanese resistance fighters. 
Importantly, Gunn also notes that such stories―like the one cited above―often featured 
young female protagonists who witnessed the martyrdom of  their (collaborationist) 
fathers.71 
 While the veracity of  such stories is hardly credible, they do help to provide a clear 
characterization of  the female archetypes that PGROC propagandists constructed. In the 
case of  Wan Ruyu, we find a semi-literate daughter of  rural merchants (her father is 
described as the owner of  a village grain store) who is loyal to her native place. She is a 
desexualized figure―so much so that she is even exempted from the sexual violence 
visited upon her sister. Importantly, however, she is decisive, independent, and politically 
aware, for while she never opposes patriarchy, the circumstances of  occupation demand 
that she acts in the absence of  male leadership. She knows a communist when she sees 
one, having witnessed the murder of  her father at their hands. And she leads the 
remnants of  her family (namely her elderly mother and prepubescent brother) to seek 
safety within the walls of  occupied Beijing (now 'radiant' by virtue of  its occupation)―i.e., 
to become a 'PGROC new woman' in the symbolic and political center of  occupied 
north China. 
 Wan Ruyu's 'peasant girl' story therefore aligns with the visual narrative of  the 
PGROC 'new woman' which was being told through poster art at the same time (indeed, 
the cartoon-like portrait of  the fictitious Wan Ruyu on the pamphlet's cover shows her  
adopting many 'new woman' traits). She is educated and political, but she is also chaste, 
pious, and attached to a male child (in this case her brother). Just as importantly, however, 
the story suggests an imagined link between the young and educated 'PGROC new 
woman' of  occupied Beijing, and the rural girl of  the quintessential Shanxi village, thus 
attempting to 'square the circle' between the bifurcated rhetoric of  Confucian tradition 
and the 'New Order.' (Figure 11)  
  
Conclusion 
As Prasenjit Duara has argued, the concept of  women as the 'the soul of  
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tradition-within-modernity' was common to many forms of  conservative Chinese 
nationalism in the first decades of  the twentieth century.72 This grew out of  deep-rooted 
notions about 'female behavior...[being]...the measure of  social morality,' and the use of  
women as moral exemplars (both positive and negative) in Chinese literary history.73 
Despite May 4th attacks on patriarchy, the notion that women embodied all that was 
'pure' about Chinese civilization, or that women could be employed as 'signifiers' for 
wider social conditions, continued to be expressed in diverse forms of  twentieth-century 
Chinese nationalism.74 Indeed, the survival of  such notions into the present day partly 
explains the hostility amongst sections of  Chinese society to the film Lust, Caution in 
2007, for any text which employs a female signifier to question the validity of  concepts 
such as 'treason' (rather than to signify the rights and wrongs of  any behavior under 
occupation) is by its very nature subversive.75 
 In its packaging of  'new women' as the 'soul of  tradition-within-modernity,' then, 
the PGROC was not particularly remarkable, and as I have suggested above, gendered 
archetypes employed by this regime were reminiscent of  figures celebrated under the 
preceding Nationalist regime of  Chiang Kai-shek, which the PGROC professed to loathe. 
What is remarkable, however, is the extent to which this Chinese 'new woman' shared a 
good deal in common with other collaborationist figures developed in quite different 
parts of  the world, particularly―as I have stressed throughout this paper―in Vichy 
France. In other words, rather than simply tracing the provenance of  the PGROC 'new 
woman' to pre-war China, and by connection anchoring her to a specifically Chinese 
story about modernity, gender and war, the parallels that emerge between this figure and 
archetypes in other contexts should prompt us to consider what she tells us about the 
uses of  gender in collaborationist nationalism more generally. In doing so, we need not 
necessarily succumb to the temptation of  creating a 'catch-all' model of  gendered 
archetypes under collaboration. We may, however, find a means of  moving beyond 
narrowly national or regional particularities when seeking to explain the prominence of  
recurring themes and characteristics under very different regimes. 
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 One issue that the PGROC 'new woman' highlights, for example, is the difficulty 
that collaborationist ideologues face in claiming a primeval link to the civilization of  the 
societies they claim to represent while at the same time acknowledging the novelty of  the 
wartime context. In the case of  the PGROC this was particularly pronounced precisely 
because this regime based its existence on the claim that modern Chinese nationalism of  
the sort found in the treaty ports had ruined China, and that a return to older Confucian 
norms was needed. At the same time, however, it found itself  speaking to some of  most 
well-informed urban women in China, and it recognized that this group had the potential 
to assist (or undermine) the regime in its efforts to introduce the 'New Order.' The 
PGROC new woman―like her Vichy, and other, collaborationist sisters―was an 
incongruous by-product of  this compromise.  
 The PGROC 'new woman' also helps to broaden findings made by gender 
historians of  Vichy about the 'sexless maternalism' of  depictions of  French women in 
WWII France. The de-sexualization of  collaborationist archetypes, and the segregation 
of  male and female figures in collaborationist propaganda that we see in Vichy and 
occupied north China, suggest that there is something fundamentally different about 
collaborationist gendering of  the nation. As I have suggested, this reflects the difficulty 
of  reconciling a context in which the status of  fighting-age men becomes far more 
sensitive, and in which women are thus called upon to play a far more active role in 
occupation politics―and in some cases even presented as the mothers of  a new 
generation of  subservient occupied peoples. 
 It is the 'visual history' approach that helps to make such messages apparent, for by 
analyzing visual texts, we are able to get beyond debates (that have shaped the field this 
far) about the choices made by individual women who served collaborationist regimes. 
Instead, we can begin to detect similarities, convergences and continuities in the symbols 
and icons adopted by regimes across national and temporal borders. Future research may 
go further in teasing out the pictorial similarities that emerged in cognate regimes by 
extending this approach even further, and perhaps testing the application of  these 
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observations beyond the examples that have been explored in this paper. 
 In March 1940, the PGROC was officially disbanded with the creation of  Wang 
Jingwei's 'Reorganized National Government of  the Republic of  China.' It is this latter 
regime, immortalized in films such as Lust, Caution, which remains to this day the 
epitome of  the occupation 'puppet state' in China. While a certain degree of  autonomy 
was retained in areas formerly governed by the PGROC, the national pretensions that 
Wang Kemin's regime has once entertained were no longer tenable. This lack of  
longevity probably helps explain why this regime has remained so understudied in the 
historiography of  wartime China thus far. In its reinvention of  the 'new woman,' its 
attempts to enlist urban Chinese women into its 'New Order' agenda, and in the 
extensive ephemera it left to posterity, this otherwise unremarkable regime has the 
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